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The Political Economy of Compliance: Winners and Losers in the European Union
I. Introduction
The literature on compliance with supranational law within the European Union has 
grown in scope and sophistication.  However, debate remains over the primary causes of 
noncompliance.  This is at least for two reasons.  First, the focus on EC directives and 
their delayed or incorrect implementation does not capture true noncompliant behavior. 
Whether EC directives are implemented on time or correctly  does not address a core 
conceptual feature of noncompliance.  Noncompliance refers to existing state behavior 
that  is  not  in conformity with a  specific  rule,  not poor implementation.   Second,  the 
disproportionate focus on directives ignores the economic costs of adjustment that many 
firms, industries, and even Member States experienced as the single European market 
was created, which causes noncompliance.  
This study moves the research on noncompliance in the EU forward in two respects. 
First, it explores noncompliance with a type of EU law—the EC Treaty and associated 
regulations—that  is  missing  in  current  scholarship.   Second,  it  also  identifies  the 
economic interests that can stand in the way of completing the internal market.  Those 
obstacles include firms and industries that cannot compete as free trade expands within 
the EU.  But countries that engage in higher levels of intra-industry trade (IIT) than inter-
industry trade will face fewer economic adjustment costs and commit fewer violations of 
EU law. Quantitative analysis of legal infringements during the construction of the single 
market also shows that typical political economy variables, such as partisanship and high 
levels of unemployment, lead to more noncompliance.  However, once the single market 
is completed, levels of EU trade and capacity issues explain noncompliance after 1992. 
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These findings show that compliance behavior changes over time.
This article begins by highlighting the important differences between implementation 
and noncompliance within the context of EU law.  Next, I outline a series of hypotheses 
that predict when infringements of EU law will most likely occur.  These hypotheses are 
then tested quantitatively using an original dataset constructed by the author. I conclude 
with a summary of my findings and suggestions for further research are presented. 
II. The Difference between Transposition and Transgression
Most  of  the  scholarly  literature  on  compliance  in  the  EU  centers  on  directive 
transposition.1  The  EU compliance  literature  so far  revolves  around the  question  of 
whether capacity or national interests best explain noncompliance, which is part of the 
larger debate between the management and enforcement schools of compliance (Tallberg 
2002).  From the point of view of constructing the single market, this approach is not 
without merit.  The Commission’s 1985 White Paper, or the Delors Report, outlined 279 
measures necessary to complete the internal market with a deadline of 1992.2  The Single 
European Act (SEA) introduced QMV to speed up the supranational legislative process 
by removing the national veto of proposed legislation in the area of the single market. 
The Member States and Commission also concluded that directives, which allow Member 
States to devise national legislation that were most appropriate to meet EU policy goals, 
would make it more likely that economic integration would be achieved sooner.  What is 
missing from the EU compliance literature, however, is a clear justification for why the 
on-time  or  correct  transposition  of  a  EU  directive  is  the  most  effective  means  of 
measuring compliance.  I argue that there are several reasons why directive transposition 
3Draft: Please Do Not Cite Without 
Permission
Scott N. Siegel The Political Economy of Compliance February 2, 
2010
should not be where the primary focus should lie. 
First,  the  selection  of  directive  implementation  is  surprising  given  the  number  of 
regulations approved by the EC Council far exceeds those of directives.
---INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE---
Although some are highly technical and narrow in focus, regulations are a common tool 
of achieving economic integration.  Also, the advantage of selecting regulations is that 
they have immediate effect on state behavior.  Governments are not given an opportunity 
to devise national implementing legislation that deviates substantially from the rule.  If 
there is anywhere where noncompliance is expected to occur, it is in regards to this type 
of EU law.  
Second, even with an overwhelming focus on directives, the relative importance of 
various factors in explaining variation in timeliness is yet to be determined.  A variety of 
factors are cited as inhibiting timely transposition.  They include political preferences at 
the EU-level (König and Luetgert 2008), the characteristics of the directives themselves 
(Kaeding 2008; Thomson et al. 2007), or state capabilities  (Berglund et al. 2006; Linos 
2004).  Additional studies show that domestic political preferences affect the timeliness 
of transposition  (Falkner et al. 2005; Treib 2003).  A second branch of EU compliance 
scholarship  argues  that  the  relative  “fit”  between  the  directive’s  policy  goal  and  the 
existing status quo shapes national implementation patterns  (Cowles et al. 2001; Duina 
1997; Héritier et al. 2001; Knill 1998). Despite the great amount of ink spilled so far, 
there is little agreement among researchers in terms of what factors are most important in 
explaining transposition delay.
The lack of consensus is partly attributed to the limited empirical range of the case 
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studies.  Qualitative research in compliance studies provides rich, detailed descriptions of 
the compliance process.  But little methodological justification is provided for why some 
countries or policy areas are selected for case study analysis and not others, besides that 
they are the largest Member States or are of particular interest to the investigators.  The 
turn towards quantitative methods has the advantage of generating greater comparability 
over a larger sample size (Mbaye 2001; Perkins and Neumayer 2007).  But, as Hartlapp 
and Falkner (2009) argue, many of these studies fail to explain how and why compliance 
is defined as it is  (Hartlapp and Falkner 2009).  The authors also present a convincing 
case for why the data located in annual Commission reports or letters  of notification 
should not be taken on face value as indicators or relative compliance (ibid.: 283-296).
Most importantly, Hartlapp and Falkner (2009) raise a larger objection to the existing 
scholarship  by  emphasizing  again  the  difference  between  implementation  and 
compliance.  Implementation refers to the legal and political process of carrying a policy 
initiative and then testing whether the policy goal was reached.  In contrast, compliance 
refers to whether “the actual behavior of the subject conforms to prescribed behavior, and 
noncompliance  or  violation  occurs  when  actual  behavior  departs  significantly  from 
prescribed  (Young 1979: 70; Raustiala and Slaughter 2001; Zürn 2005).” Hartlapp and 
Falkner follow with a longer discussion of why correct implementation instead should be 
the future focus of compliance research (Hartlapp and Falkner 2009: 284).
Assessing the correctness of legal implementation is a small step forward on the path 
towards better understanding the post-transposition process.  Yet, it still does not get us to 
true noncompliance.  Degree of correctness does show whether states are fulfilling their 
legal obligation to implement directives in line with EC policy goals.  However, we do 
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not  know the  impact  of  incorrect  transposition  until  the  subsequent  behavior  of  the 
Member  State  is  observed.   Also,  is  incorrect  implementation  significant  enough  to 
warrant our attention and limited resources?  If so, we need to know how much incorrect 
transposition jeopardizes the impact of reaching an EC directive’s goal.  Even if this can 
be estimated, the result would only tell us how much a policy objective was reached, not 
necessarily  whether  a  country’s  behavior  is  complying  with  EU  law.   Furthermore, 
because  there  is  a  high  level  of  unreliability  in  existing  data  sources  in  regards  to 
directive implementation, attention should turn towards violations of the EC Treaty and 
associated regulations, which have a higher level of reliability. 
Third,  regulations  and  the  EC  Treaty  specify  the  state  behavior  that  is  pro-  or 
prescribed and nonconformity, after a period of time, is prosecuted under Article 226. 
But given the vast scope of the EU regulatory state and its penetration into almost all 
areas of state governance, we will never know precisely how much noncompliance in the 
EU exists.  Yet, comparing EC Treaty violations across time and countries does help us 
understand why noncompliance is happening more often in some places and time periods 
than in others.
Understanding implementation timeliness and incorrectness is obviously not wholly 
unwarranted.   States  are  legally  required to  implement  directives  on time.3  And the 
importance of directives to constructing the single European market cannot be denied. 
Because there was growing opposition among the Member States to ECJ decisions that 
required the discriminatory national barriers  to EC trade be brought down,4 directives 
became perceived  as  a  more  effective  way of  obtaining  broader  political  support  for 
economic integration by fitting EU directives to national policy traditions.  If so, then the 
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single market would be completed sooner.  However, the research conducted so far tells 
little about whether directives are actually achieving this goal, especially in at least one 
respect,  whether  obstacles  to  intra-European  trade  came  down.   How  important  are 
directives  versus  prosecutions  for  violations  of  the  EC Treaty  in  creating  the  single 
market?  Is the number of national discriminatory practices increasing or decreasing as 
directives are being implemented? Not all of these questions are answered here, but why 
states violate the EC Treaty and other forms of hard law is a first step.
Finally,  noncompliance  with  EC  Treaty  and  its  regulations  are  substantively 
important  to  understanding  both  how the  EU legal  order  emerged  and its  regulatory 
character.  For example, the Commission’s prosecutions of violations of the EC Treaty 
(ECT) led to the development of two of the most important principles in EU law.  The 
doctrine of direct effect, established in Van Gend en Loos, arose out of a dispute over a 
Dutch  tariff  that  violated  Article  25  ECT.   Costa  v.  ENEL,  establishing  EU  legal 
supremacy,  also  resulted  from  several  suspected  violations  of  the  EC  Treaty.5 
Prosecuting noncompliance also kept the engine of European integration running in the 
1970s,  as  stagflation  led  governments  to  impose  protectionist  measures  (Alter  2000, 
2001; Mattli and Slaughter 1998; Slaughter et al. 1998).  Assessing where and why these 
violations occur can signal what type of violations draw the attention of the Commission 
and perhaps the future content and reach of EU law.  
III. The Political Economy of Intra-Industry Trade 
The Single  European market  stimulated  trade  within  industries  as  much as  it  did 
between them through increasing European exports and imports.  The completion of the 
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1992  Project  was  likely  to  produce  significant  economic  adjustment  difficulties  as  a 
result.    The comparative advantage some national industries enjoyed would play less of 
a role in EU trade patterns than differences over quality and type of specific products 
within industries.  As a result, the adjustment costs to growing intra-industry trade (IIT) 
are lower than in inter-industry trade.  My findings show that countries that engage in 
high levels of intra-industry trade (IIT) comply more often with EU law than those that 
do not.
IIT has a distinctive political economy.  Past scholarship in the political economy of 
international trade focuses on inter-industry trade.  The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (H-
O-S) model of international trade suggests that countries will export goods and services a 
country has a comparative advantage in terms of the factors they are abundant in and 
import products in which a country’s factors are relatively scarce.  The key assumption in 
standard H-O-S models is that factors are mobile.  Support and opposition to tariffs is 
based on a country’s relative factor endowment or the mobility within them (Stolper and 
Samuelson 1941; Rogowski 1989).
The political economy of trade changes, however, when both labor and capital are 
assumed  not  to  be  mobile.   Instead,  if  factors  are  industry-specific,  sectors  begin 
producing differentiated products rather than homogenous ones.  They are differentiated 
by quality, either horizontally or vertically.   In vertical differentiation, consumers order 
their  preferences  for  different  products  based  on  their  relative  quality.   Horizontal 
integration refers to consumers choosing among similar products that differ according to 
some unique  quality  that  is  not  easily  measured.   For  example,  in  the  case  of  beer, 
vertical differentiation means consumers have a choice among a variety of beers with 
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different  amounts  of  water,  hops,  and  undergo  different  fermentation  processes, 
improving  or  weakening  a  beer’s  flavor.   In  horizontal  variation,  consumers  choose 
among a number of high quality beers, such as whether it is a lager, pilsner or stout. 
Demand and, therefore, relative imports and exports, is determined less by price than by 
consumers’ perceptions of the quality of these products or consumer tastes.
In  the  case  of  inter-industry  trade,  prices  across  countries  converge  as  factor 
endowments equalize between countries.  In contrast, IIT leads to product specialization, 
where markets are imperfect and consumer preferences and returns to scale determine 
trade patterns.  In IIT, labor and capital requirements are more similar within an industry 
than between them.  As IIT between a country and its regional trading partners increases, 
firms retrain workers and direct resources to more competitive product lines.  In addition, 
New Trade theory predicts countries begin to specialize along particular product lines, 
because of imperfect markets, diverse consumer tastes, and economies of scale (Krugman 
1979).   As  a  result,  specific  geographies  of  firms  concentrated  in  specific  industries 
develop.    Increased  free  trade  also  leads  higher  levels  of  intra-industry  over  time. 
Krugman (1981) concludes, therefore, that the adjustment costs associated with IIT are 
lower than in inter-industry trade (Krugman 1981).
Yet,  not  all  economists  agree  that  all  sectors  of  industries  adjust  smoothly.   The 
structure of the labor is usually cited as the main culprit  (Greenaway and Milner 1986; 
Neary 1985).  Little empirical support exists to support these hypotheses.  Second, these 
arguments  ignore the role political  and economic  institutions  can ease the process of 
adjustment  (Katzenstein 1985).  Controlling for other factors, I hypothesize that those 
countries  that  engage  in  IIT  more  than  inter-industry  will  face  fewer  economic 
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adjustment costs and, thus, will comply more often.
IIT and Noncompliance
How is the political economy of IIT related to violations of EU law?  The Treaty of 
the European Community explicitly forbids quantitative and qualitative restrictions on the 
free  movement  of  goods  and services  unless  they  are  justified  on  a  series  of  policy 
grounds, such as health and safety (Articles 28-30 ECT).  ECJ decisions early in the EU’s 
legal history took a broad view of what national measures discriminated against other 
countries’ products and services.  Subsequent legal jurisprudence limited what types of 
obstacles and under what conditions these national measures were required to be removed 
(see Maduro 1998).  
Nevertheless, the main purpose behind the EC Treaty in the area of internal market is 
to bring down barriers to trade and enable the free movement of goods and services.  The 
customs union and later the 1992 Project sought to increase market competition, reduce 
prices for European consumers, and increase levels of innovation.  Whether caused by 
states pursuing their national interests  (Moravcsik 1998) or the powerful role of ideas 
surrounding the free market  (Jabko 2006),  the effect  of  integration  would be greater 
economic competition.  Import-competing industries would have a harder time adjusting 
to  a  growth  in  intra-European  trade.   As  a  result,  they  lobby  their  governments  to 
maintain  national  measures  that  provided  them  with  an  artificial  trade  advantages 
(Grossman  and Helpman  2002).   The  literature  on  the  political  economy of  trade  is 
replete with examples (Frieden 1988; Hiscox 2002; Rogowski 1989).  
If countries have high levels of intra-industry, they more likely to be immune from 
the effects of more free trade and, thus, comply with EU law.  First, if a country engages 
10Draft: Please Do Not Cite Without 
Permission
Scott N. Siegel The Political Economy of Compliance February 2, 
2010
mainly in intra-industry trade, then they will have fewer national measures prohibiting 
the entry of products and services from other Member States.   Expanding markets of 
scale  and  responding  to  diverse  consumer  tastes,  heretofore  hindered  by  national 
measures in other countries, will lead to strong support from national industries and firms 
for economic integration.  The number of industrial sectors engaged in IIT is greater than 
those in inter-industry trade, especially as economic development increases.  
Second,  compared  to  inter-industry  trade,  both capital  and labor  will  be in  favor 
complying with EU law, neutralizing class divisions over free trade somewhat.  High 
levels of IIT also make states more immune to the effects of price competition that arises 
when  free  trade  increases.   When  the  Commission  discovers  nontariff  barriers, 
governments of countries with high levels of IIT will quickly remove them because the 
benefits  of  complying  more  than  outweigh the  costs  of  noncompliance.   In  contrast, 
countries  with low levels  of IIT are likely to  use these trade barriers  to  protect  their 
uncompetitive industries, given the source of their comparative advantage.  
H1:  Countries with less intra-industry trade commit more violations of the 
EC Treaty and associated regulations.
Yet,  the  relationship  between  a  country’s  level  of  intra-industry  trade  and 
noncompliance could also be positive.  Rather than import-competing industries calling 
for protection, national measures can also create specialized product lines.  If removed, 
firms will no longer benefit from protection that discourages the entry of similar products 
that appeal to different consumers’ tastes.  The German Beer Purity Law is an example. 
The law allowed other beers to enter Germany, but they could only be marketed as such 
if they contained only four ingredients.  Once the law was removed, other types of beer 
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could enter the country on equal regulatory grounds as domestically produced goods.6 
In this  scenario,  levels  of intra-industry trade serves as a proxy for nontariff  barriers 
(NTBs).   Empirical  evidence  supporting  this  hypothesis  is  mixed.   Tumlir  (1979) 
suggests a positive relationship between nontariff  barriers  and IIT  (Tumlir  1979),  but 
Greenaway  and  Milner  (1986)  find  little  statistical  support  for  this  hypothesis 
(Greenaway and Milner 1986: 164).
H2:  Countries with more intra-industry trade commit more violations of the  
EC Treaty and associated regulations.
Levels of IIT are one possible factor that shapes a Member State’s interest in pursuing 
European  integration  and  complying  with  EU law.   This  argument  is  tested  against 
several other typical political economy explanations for failure to comply with EU law.
First,  countries  that  export  more to the EU and import  less should commit  fewer 
violations  of  EU law.    Second,  several  countries  still  had tariff  barriers  until  1993, 
usually in the form of border controls.  Countries with more tariff barriers are likely to 
commit more violations of EU law.  Third, according to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, 
capital favors freer trade, while labor opposes it.  The theorem assumes that factors are 
highly  mobile  and,  therefore,  the  political  economy  of  free  trade  is  class-based,  in 
contrast  to IIT.7  If  true,  then we should find governments  further  to the  left  on the 
political  spectrum oppose complying  with  the  EC Treaty  more often  than  right-wing 
ones.  Related, high levels of unemployment will make a government less likely to want 
to bare the costs of adjusting to more free trade in the EU and, thus, violate EU law more 
often.
Fifth, those countries that benefit most from EU membership by receiving funds from 
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the EU should comply sooner because of the long-term benefits of receiving EU funds 
(Perkins and Neumayer 2007).  Consistent with the management school of compliance, 
EU financial assistance can assist governments in complying with EU legal requirements. 
Governments  may  also  favor  baring  the  short-term  costs  of  dropping  discriminatory 
measures in favor of the long-term gains associated with membership.  Similarly, those 
countries whose populations support the EU in general will commit fewer violations of 
EU law.
Seventh, the regulations that the EC Council approves can reflect the preferences of 
the larger EU Member States because of their dominance in the legislative process.  In 
addition,  the  Commission  could  be  reluctant  to  pursue  cases  of  legal  infringements 
against  larger Member States out of fear they will  retaliate by reducing its regulatory 
powers and oversight.  If so, then the size of a country or its voting power in the EC 
Council can affect how many violations appear in the sample because the Commission is 
exercising its discretion.
The factors mentioned above flow from the enforcement school of compliance.  The 
enforcement school argues that states comply with the agreements they made only when 
the costs  of doing so outweigh the benefits.   Factors such as levels  of EU trade and 
political  ideology measure  the  interest  states  have  in  complying  with  the EC Treaty. 
Sometimes,  when the  threat  of  sanctions  appears,  under  Article  228 ECT, states  will 
change  the  legislative  status  quo.   But  according  to  the  management  school, 
noncompliance  is  the  result  of  inadvertent  difficulties  related  to  poor  or  ineffective 
resources to meet  their  international  legal  obligations.   Once the Commission detects 
possible violations,  shortcomings in state capacity  can hinder compliance.   Therefore, 
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bureaucratic  capacity  can play strong role  in  determining  the number of  violations  a 
country commits.  In addition, the misfit hypothesis argues that noncompliance occurs 
when the demands of the EC legislation are not congruent with national policymaking 
traditions.  Degree of misfit is difficult to measure consistently across countries.  Instead, 
dummy variables for national legal traditions are incorporated into the model.  Finally, 
economic  growth  should  enhance  a  state’s  capacity  to  adjust  to  the  Commission’s 
demands over time, as well as increase IIT levels, reducing the number of violations a 
Member State commits.
IV. Data and Results
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is the number of violations of EU law committed per year. 
Data on infringements of EU law related to the EC Treaty and associated regulations 
were  collected  from the  European  Commission’s  Annual  Reports  of  the  Commission 
Monitoring the  Application  of  European Community  Law from 1978 to  2002 for  the 
EU-15.  The Commission lists violations of the EC Treaty and associated regulations 
separately  from other  sources  of  noncompliance  and  by  policy  area.   Over  50% of 
violations reported were related to the single market.  Each reported infringement lists the 
general regulatory policy, for example, “the Beer Purity Law,” and the specific regulation 
and/or ECT article suspected of being violated that reached “Reasoned Opinion” stage of 
the  infringement  process.   This  stage  occurs  after  the  Formal  Notice  stage  and  the 
government either fails to respond or disagrees with the Commission’s legal arguments 
for lifting or changing the national measure.  We do not know how many violations were 
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terminated before they reached this stage.  This is one reason why the total amount of 
noncompliance still remains a mystery.  But there is little reason to suspect that some 
countries are able to terminate their violations sooner than others for reasons not captured 
here.
The  reliability  of  the  Commission’s  reports  is  questionable  on  several  grounds 
(Börzel 2001; Hartlapp and Falkner 2009).  For example, over the course of time, the 
Commission changed the policy area definition in which a violation was committed as 
the Commission’s bureaucracy was restructured.  Some violations reported in one year’s 
annual report  are dropped in the subsequent year’s reports without listing the reasons 
behind its termination in the compliance process.  Are violations of EU law independent 
from each other?   Commission officials confirmed in personal interviews that only a 
legal  justification  based  on  the  discriminatory  nature  of  the  violation  motivates  any 
initiation of an infringement proceeding and politics play no role in case selection.  But if 
the Commission employs a legal strategy to strike down measures that are common to 
more than one Member State,  then it  is  not  safe to assume independence  among the 
observations  of  noncompliance.   However,  conceptualizing  the  legal  strategy  of  the 
Commission is and how it changes over time is difficult in a quantitative analysis.  We 
also assume that the Commission is not targeting a specific set of Member States when 
pursuing that strategy.  Rather, they are targeting a specific legal practice that is common 
to a set of Member States. 
Figure 2 shows that Belgium, France, Greece, and Italy have committed, on average, 
the highest number of legal violations.  
---INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE---
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In comparison, Denmark and the Netherlands have committed relatively few violations, 
as have Austria, Sweden and Finland, although they were still relatively new members. 
The cross-national distribution conforms to Falkner et al.’s description of “three worlds 
of compliance (Falkner et al. 2005).”  The disadvantage of their explanatory framework 
is  that  the causal mechanism for compliance across countries cannot be arrayed on a 
single  dimension.   While  a  legal  or  political  culture  explains  early  compliance  by 
Scandinavian countries, partisan politics explains delayed implementation often in other 
countries  and  incapacity  in  others.   My  argument  moves  past  this  explanation  by 
explaining variation along a single causal dimension, which is a function of the political 
economy of European economic integration.
Independent Variables
Measuring IIT has been an evolving process.8  Grubel and Lloyd (1975) developed 
the most common method used in many empirical studies (Grubel and Lloyd 1975).  The 
index measures the difference between exports and imports as a proportion of total trade 
in that industry.  However, it is a static measure and cannot take into account country-
specific changes over time.  Instead, the Brühlhart  A index is used to measure marginal 
changes in IIT (Brühlhart and Elliot 1998).  The formula is as follows:
Ai = 1 - |∆ X - ∆ M|/|∆ X|+|∆ M|
A for an individual country(i) is equal to the change in total exports between t and t-1  
minus the change in imports over the same period divided by the total of the absolute 
value of the change in a country’s imports and exports.  Values approach 1 should high 
levels  of IIT, while values approaching 0 represent low levels of IIT and a country’s 
international  trade  is  almost  exclusively  between  industries  rather  than  within  them. 
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Levels of bilateral IIT for 28 industries at the 3-digit ISIC level are aggregated for each 
country.  Because trade data for Belgium and Luxembourg are available only as one unit, 
the two countries are treated as one group.  Values for other independent variables for 
these  two countries  are  then  either  averaged  or  summed as  appropriate.   Tariffs  are 
measured  by  the  total  revenue  received  from customs  divided  by  the  total  value  of 
imports, or the trade-weighted average tariff (Ehrlich 2007).  Ehrlich (2005) argues that 
tariffs and nontariff barriers, their removal being the key goal of the 1992 Program, are 
complements to each other rather than substitutes.  If so, then tariffs are a good indicator 
of protectionism.  In the case of the EU, however, national discriminatory measures can 
act as substitutes for tariffs because Member States devise new ways to protect industries 
from increased competition.  
Figure 3 depicts mean levels of IIT and tariffs for 12 countries from 1980 to 1993, 
until the single market was completed.  
---INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE---
It  appears  that  countries  with  high  levels  of  IIT  also  have  low tariffs,  although  the 
relationship is not statistically significant.  Some of the poorer Member States have low 
levels of IIT while richer ones are considerably higher.  This conforms to the general rule 
that  economic  development  is  a  strong  predictor  for  IIT.   There  is  greater  national 
variation in IIT than in overall levels of EU trade among the Member States.  
---INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE---
Exports and imports to and from the EU are approximately 50% of total world trade, on 
average, for each Member State, with the Netherlands as an outlier.   Table 1 lists the 
remaining  independent  variables,  their  measurement,  sources,  summary  statistics,  and 
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predicted effect on the dependent variable.
---INSERT TABLE 1 HERE---
Data Analysis
A negative binomial regression with random effects is fitted to pooled cross-sectional 
data.9   A positive coefficient  should be interpreted  as the probability  that  increasing 
levels of X lead to higher than expected values of the dependent variable.  Four different 
model specifications are applied to the data and a reported in Table 2.  The first model 
examines the effects of an interest-based model or the enforcement school of compliance. 
---INSERT TABLE 2 HERE---
We can confirm the hypotheses that increasing levels of IIT in a country lead to fewer 
violations of EU law.  For a unit increase in any value if IIT, the expected number of 
violations is reduced by 53%.   Unemployment increases the predicted number by 4%. 
The impact of partisan ideology is less, only decreasing the predicted value by 1.3%.  The 
role of size or state influence in the Council remains uncertain, albeit large, because the 
results  are  contradictory.   While  a  unit  increase  in  a  Member  State’s  voting  power 
decreases the predicted number of violations by 100%, a unit  increase in a country’s 
population increases the predicted number by 100%. 
In the full  model,  variables  related to state  capacity  prove not to  be important  to 
explaining  variations  in  noncompliance.   IIT  and  unemployment  remain  statistically 
significant,  but  most  other  factors  disappear  with  the  exception  of  EU  exports  and 
imports.  Over time the number of infringements decline as the single market is put in 
place and all remaining customs duties are removed and the common customs code is put 
into place.
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The second set of models restricts the time period to after 1992.  Here we see the role 
of a member state’s voting power to increase the expected number of violations.  The 
fourth model  includes  both enforcement  and management  school  variables.   National 
legal  traditions  are  excluded  because  they  are  perfectly  correlated  with  bureaucratic 
quality.   Net  transfer  payments,  wealth,  and  increasing  levels  of  bureaucratic  quality 
reduce the predicted number of violations, but increasing domestic political constraints 
and economic growth lead to a higher number of violations than predicted.  Increasing 
economic growth also has a positive effect, but this may simply be the result of adding 
three new wealthy states, Austria, Sweden and Finland, to the sample.  
Still,  levels  of  IIT and unemployment  no longer  predict  the number of violations 
observed.   One  explanation  is  that  trade  patterns  among  the  Member  States  have 
converged.  Intra- and not inter- industry trade now dominates the nature of EU trade. 
Second, states learned how to comply with EU law and refrain from introducing new 
discriminatory measures by notifying the Commission of proposed new ones (Directive 
83/1989).  The decline of partisanship as a significant explanatory factor also indicates 
learning taking place.  
Variables  measuring  institutional  constraints  and  bureaucratic  quality  behave 
unexpectedly,  decreasing  and  increasing  the  expected  number  of  infringements, 
respectively, in the two models using data after 1992.  However, skepticism of their true 
effect is due (Perkins and Neumayer 2007).  First, there is little variation in bureaucratic 
quality across Member States over time.  With some minor exceptions, such as Greece 
and Portugal in the early 1980s, all other Member States receive a bureaucratic quality 
score in the seventy-fifth percentile (3.5 out of 4) and by 1994 all Member States had a 
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score of 3 or higher.  Low levels of bureaucratic quality is also strongly correlated with a 
French national legal tradition, both of which encompass the Member States that commit 
the greatest number of legal violations.   The role of institutional constraints should also 
be  viewed  with  skepticism.   Both  Germany  and  Belgium  score  high  in  terms  of 
institutional  constraints,  but  produce  almost  polar  opposite  numbers  of  violations. 
Bureaucratic quality is also highly correlated with the years a country is a EU member. 
This may indicate that governments are learning to comply, irrespective of their position 
on the ideological spectrum or ability to veto complying legislation.  Because individual 
country-effects  cannot  be  introduced into  the model  without  generating  severe  multi-
collinearity,  each country was step-wise removed from the model.  In most cases, the 
variables of interest strengthened in influence.  Excluding France reduces the importance 
of ideology in the models and the exclusion of Spain, the Member State with the highest 
level of unemployment, reduces the effect of unemployment.  Finally, when limiting the 
types of violations to just violations in the internal market, all variables remain significant 
and the coefficient for partisan ideology increases in influence.
Discussion
The quantitative  analysis  explains  why some countries  violate  EU law more than 
others.   Levels  of  IIT  as  well  as  some  other  political  economy  factors,  such  as 
unemployment and partisanship, explain why they occur.  However, there are changes in 
their  causal  effect  over  time.   For  example,  partisanship  significantly  declines  as  a 
possible explanatory factor.  This serves as indirect evidence that attitudes towards the 
European Union converged among the main political parties.  If true, then opposition to 
complying with EU legal demands could be being channeled to the extreme right and left 
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ends of the political spectrum.  At the same time, lower levels of noncompliance over 
time do not just imply that fewer discriminatory measures are on the books.  It also shows 
that  European  integration  has  generally  been  economically  beneficial  for  the  EU’s 
Member States.  Either more trade among EU members can explain this or the transfer 
payments governments enjoy through membership. 
Violations of the EC Treaty and associated regulations capture actual noncompliance. 
Each infringement of EU law is a suspected type of regulation or rule that discriminates 
against the entry of other goods and services from other Member States on unjustifiable 
ground.  Yet, it is important to remember that the Reasoned Opinion stage is only the first 
step in the compliance process.  The case can still be referred to the Court of Justice and 
settled there, either in favor or against the Member State.  It is not inevitable that the 
Court will rule against the national government and, therefore, the infringement observed 
is an actual violation.  But since the Member States lose over 85% of the cases settled by 
the ECJ at the end of the compliance process, it  is relatively safe to assume that the 
violations the Commission is choosing to prosecute are in fact infractions of EU law. 
The Member States are presumed guilty until proven innocent.
The sample also included all infringements of EU law irrespective of the policy area 
in which they were committed.  When sampling only among infringements in the area of 
the  single  market,  levels  of  IIT and unemployment  remained  statistically  significant. 
Relationships became weaker when sampling violations strictly outside the area of the 
internal  market.   Further  research  is  required  to  ascertain  why  some institutional  or 
interest-based  factors  are  relevant  to  good compliance  in  one policy  area  and not  in 
another.   For  example,  labor  market  institutions,  such  as  unions  and  employers 
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associations may be relevant to compliance behavior related to social policy, levels of 
agricultural employment or strength of environmental groups are more likely to have an 
important  effect  in  these areas.   Irrespective  of the possible  parochial  nature of each 
policy area, the quantitative analysis above still produces robust results.
Another shortcoming of this study is that it says little about how much noncompliance 
truly  exists.   First,  the  amount  of  noncompliance  depends  on  the  ability  of  the 
Commission to detect and prosecute possible violations, which are limited.  Thus, it relies 
on either fire alarms or police powers to detect violations of EU law (Jensen 2007).  It is 
assisted by notification from private individuals through Article 226 or by other Member 
States through Article 227.  The former is how the Commission becomes aware of many 
possible violations, when it does not detect them on its own.  Comparatively, sources of 
possible violations rarely come from other Member States out of fear of retaliation.  Each 
member state has the incentive to agree to a EU legislative item and then defect because 
its  defection  will  go  largely  unnoticed  and then  benefit  from national  discriminatory 
measures coming down elsewhere, a classic problem of collective action.
This  study  is  limited  to  violations  of  the  EC  Treaty  and  associated  regulations. 
However, this is not the only type of actual noncompliant behavior that can be studied. 
Noncompliance  also  occurs  because  directives  are  misapplied to  specific  regulatory 
situations.   Noncompliance  can  also  be  observed  when  illegal  behavior  continues 
because a  directive  was implemented  incorrectly  or  delayed.   Yet,  the  noncompliant 
behavior is still the ongoing regulatory practices and not necessarily incorrect or delayed 
implementation of a directive.  So far, there are few studies that look at how delayed or 
incorrectly implemented directives maintain illegal state practices.
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Finally, what are the implications for our theories of noncompliance in the EU?  The 
results show that interest-based factors play a stronger role in explaining infringements of 
EU law.  The Member States that engage in less IIT have more laws on the books that 
discriminate against goods and services from other Member States.  After 1992, once the 
customs union was fully completed, levels of EU trade and higher voting power in the EC 
Council  also  leads  to  noncompliance.   This  shows  that  states  are  willing  to  forgo 
complying  until  the  costs  become  too  high  to  bare.   This  can  come  in  the  form of 
sanctions  by the Commission,  retaliatory  behavior  by other  members,  or the national 
government not wishing to jeopardize the long-term benefits of EU membership for the 
short-term  gains  for  a  small,  but  powerful  interest  group  (Phelan  2006).   Thus,  the 
evidence strengthens the explanatory power of the enforcement school.  Factors related to 
the  management  school—bureaucratic  capacity  and  institutional  constraints—are  less 
important to explaining why some countries violate EC Treaty more than others.
V. Conclusion
This study fills a significant gap in our understanding of noncompliance in the EU. 
First, it captures true noncompliance behavior by examining violations of the ECT rather 
than  poor  or  delayed  implementation  of  EC  directives.   Second,  the  sample  size  is 
significantly large enough to test rigorously alternative theories of compliance.  Within 
this  sample,  the  more  a  country  trades  in  products  within  industries  the  lower  the 
economic costs of adjustment are and, therefore, should comply more often than those 
states engaged primarily in inter-industry trade.  The time-period-specific performance of 
the  statistical  model,  however,  suggests  that  governments  and economies  adjust  over 
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time.  Once the single market was completed and levels of intra-EU trade increased, the 
pains of economic adjustment began to ease.  This is partly illustrated by the fact that 
violations of EU law decrease over time among the EU-15.
This  study  represents  another  step  in  accounting  for  the  variation  in  compliance 
behavior  observed among EU member  states.   It  also introduces  mainstream theories 
from  the  field  of  international  and  comparative  political  economy  to  explain 
noncompliance.   My findings suggest that  EU-related research should re-focus on the 
political  economy of European integration.   For example,  more research is  needed to 
explore  the how domestic  economic factors  cause noncompliance  to  occur.   How do 
economic  and political  interest  groups  that  can hinder  compliance  with supranational 
law?  Under  what conditions  do governments  ignore their  constituents’  demands and 
when not, completely refusing to obey EU law, also deserves increased scholarly focus. 
This study represents a small step down that path.
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Figure 3.
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Figure 4.
Table 1.  Summary Statistics
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Alpha -0.67*** -0.58*** 0.05 -0.11
(-0.15) (-0.15) (-0.22) (-0.25)
Unemployment 0.05** 0.09*** -0.02 0.02
(-0.02) (-0.03) (-0.04) (-0.03)
Tariffs -0.54 -0.35
(-1.18) (-2.65)
Council Votes -6.77* 0.14 15.23 17.67*
(-3.78) (-4.7) (-13.0) (-9.25)
Partisanship -0.01*** 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (-0.01) (-0.01)
Pop 0.71*** 0.24 0.14 -0.1
(-0.18) (-0.33) (-0.44) (-0.36)
Lag Violations 0.06*** 0.03*** -0.05 -0.06
(-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.05) (-0.04)
EU Imports 0.02* 0.03** 0.08*** 0.10***
(-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.03) (-0.03)
EU Exports -0.02** -0.03** -0.05** -0.08***
(-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.02)
Net Payments p.c. 0.11 0.08 -0.82 -1.32*
(-0.42) (-0.59) (-0.73) (-0.7)
EU Popularity 0.01 0.00 0.02** 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (-0.01) (-0.01)
Duration of Membership 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02
(-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.02)
Change GDP (log) -0.92** -1.01 0.18 9.49***
(-0.41) (-1.92) -0.57 (-2.64)
Inst'l Constraints -1.8 -8.17***
(-1.24) (-2.72)
Bureaucratic Quality -0.15 2.86***
(-0.34) (-0.92)






GDP p.c. 0.77 -8.67***
(-1.97) (-2.36)
Constant -1.46 0.7 2.38 -1.53
(-0.99) (-1.39) (-4.72) (-4.88)
Observations 119 119 63 63
Number of ms 11 11 14 14
Wald Χ 2 222.10 243.77 45.87 46.79
Prob. > Χ 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Log-likelihood -271.62 -267.22 -49.79 -46.56
p < 0.10, ** p < .050, *** p < .001; Standard errors in parentheses
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Abstract
This  article  offers  a  new  explanation  of  noncompliance  with  EU  law  based  on  the 
political  economy  of  European  integration.   Analysis  of  a  unique  database  of 
infringement of EU law related to the EC Treaty and associated regulations shows that 
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those countries that engage primarily in intra-industry trade commit fewer violations of 
EU law per year.   When a country’s trades more within industries rather than across 
them,  the costs  of  economic  adjustment  are  less.   The data  analysis  also shows that 
typical  political  economy  variables,  such  as  unemployment  levels  of  EU trade,  also 
matter, but only within specified time periods.  This study refocuses our attention away 
from problems of implementation to actual causes of noncompliant behavior.
Keywords:  compliance, international trade, political economy, European Union, single 
market
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1 Other studies examine compliance with ECJ Judgments (Beach 2005; Panke 2007). For a survey of the compliance 
literature, see Hartlapp and Falkner (2009) and Mastenbroek (2005).
2 The White Paper Completing the Internal Market, COM (85) 310, June 1985.
3 EU case law states that directives supersede national law and take direct effect if the provisions are unconditional and 
sufficient (Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, [1964] ECR 585), and even when they were not yet implemented (Marleasing v. La 
Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA, Case C-106/89, [1990] ECR I-4135).
4 In Dassonville (Case 8/74, [1974] ECR 837), the ECJ empowered the Commission to target a wide variety of 
discriminatory state practices that prohibited the free movement of goods.  Later, Cassis de Dijon (Rewe-Zentral v.  
Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, Case 120/78, [1979] ECR 649) required Member States to import products that 
are lawfully produced in another member state, known as the doctrine of mutual recognition.  Member state backlash 
against the possibly broad reach of this doctrine and its effect on the ability of national governments to regulate their own 
markets led the ECJ to backtrack a bit in Keck (Keck and Mithouard, Cases C-267 & 268/91, [1993] ECR 6097).
5 In fact, there is an intimate relationship between the development of the EU constitutional order and the removing 
obstacles to the free movement of goods (Maduro 1998).
6 Commission v. Germany (German Beer Law), Case 178/84, [1987] ECR 1227.
7 See Ehrlich (2007).
8 See Greenaway and Milner (1986): 128-136.
9 A count model, rather than regular regression techniques, is employed because the dependent variable is heavily skewed 
to the left with frequent values of zero and small, discrete values.  A negative binomial regression model, instead of Poisson 
regression, was used to estimate this count data because the likelihood ratio test on each of the models showed we could 
reject the hypothesis that there was no overdispersion in the data.
10 See Brülhart (1994).
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